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Romani Minorities on the Margins of Post-Yugoslav Citizenship Regimes 
 
Julija Sardelić, University of Edinburgh1 
 
Abstract 
The main objective of this paper is to map how Romani minorities were positioned in 
the context of post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes’ transformations and to observe 
possible trends throughout post-Yugoslav space regarding their positioning. The 
paper establishes that due to historical as well as contemporary hierarchical 
inclusions, many individuals identified as belonging to Romani minorities faced 
specific obstacles in access to citizenship in most Yugoslav states, where they de facto 
resided. Consequently, it gives an illustration of citizenship constellations in which 
many Romani individuals found themselves as non-citizens at their place of 
residence and usually without the status of legal alien with permanent residence as 
well as with ineffective citizenship of another post-Yugoslav state. Additionally, it 
also examines the hierarchical positioning of Romani individuals, who are citizens at 
their place of residence and, at least de iure, enjoy a certain scope of minority rights. 
Borrowing terms from postcolonial theory and following the latest developments in 
Romani studies, this paper argues that Romani minorities were caught in-between 
different processes of post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes’ transformation, and 
therefore cannot be considered as the ultimate Other, but as the post-Yugoslav 
Subaltern.   
 
Keywords: 






The predicament of Romani minorities as citizens of different European states is still 
one of the daunting challenges for scholars as well as policy makers. As many 
different academic and non-academic studies have illustrated, the position of Romani 
minorities worsened after the end of the socialist state systems (Guy 2001, Barany 
2002, Ringold et al. 2005). Furthermore, it has also been studied that after European 
Union (EU) integration, the positioning of Romani citizens in Central and Eastern 
European states signalled the emergence of a new European apartheid rather than the 
promising prospects of EU citizenship (Balibar 2009, Vermeersch 2012). What 
remains to a certain extent under-addressed in academic literature is the positioning 
of Romani minorities on the inner and outer margins of the EU as citizens of post-
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Yugoslav states and what was the impact of citizenship regimes’ transformations 
(Shaw and Štiks 2010: 5-8) on this positioning. 
The aim of this paper is to map how post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes’ 
transformations affected Romani minorities as citizens of newly established states 
and to investigate whether there are some possible patterns and trends concerning 
that impact throughout the post-Yugoslav space. Many of the scholarly debates view 
the position of Romani minorities through the prism of a single post-Yugoslav 
citizenship (Friedman 2002, Jakšić 2002, Bogdanić 2004, Jakšić and Bašić 2005, Klopčič 
2007). This paper takes a different approach, instead focusing on the intersecting 
similarities in the positioning of Romani minorities in the context of different post-
Yugoslav citizenship regimes. The first observation of this paper lies in the fact that 
individuals externally categorized as belonging to Romani minorities had obstacles, 
specific to their position, in the access to citizenship in most post-Yugoslav states, 
where they resided. In addition, they often possessed an ineffective citizenship of 
another post-Yugoslav state. Therefore, this paper claims that due to the historical as 
well as contemporary hierarchical inclusion their position as non-citizens at their 
place of residence can be understood as embedded in specific post-Yugoslav 
citizenship constellations (Bauböck 2010). Furthermore, this paper also sheds light on 
the position of Romani minorities, who had access to citizenship at their place of 
residence and were by national legislations recognized as a minority or a community 
with, at least de iure, guaranteed group-differentiated rights (Kymlicka 1995, 2007: 61). 
As far as Romani minorities are concerned, this paper argues that certain similarities 
can be observed in their position in different post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes due to 
the common Yugoslav history as well as, to some extent, because of the further 
developments in the context of EU integration processes and the dialogue with 
different international organizations.  
Building on Joppke’s conceptualization of citizenship dimension triad, this 
paper considers the status dimension (with the emphasis on the access component) as 
well as the rights dimension, and to a lesser extent the identity dimension of 
citizenship (Joppke 2007). It highlights the specific obstacles Romani minorities faced 
in the access to citizenship in the post-Yugoslav state where they resided. It also 
examines the variety of precarious non-citizenship statuses, different from the status 
of a legal alien with regulated permanent residence, in which Romani minorities are 
highly represented such as: legally invisible persons, internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) and refugees. Furthermore, in connection to the rights dimension, it 
explicates, in what way Romani minorities are included into the body of post-
Yugoslav citizenries and what rights are granted to them based on this status. The 
main argument explored in this paper is that Romani minorities have not been 
positioned as the ultimate Other in this context, but due to the in-betweeness (Bhabha 
1990) of their position can be comprehended as the post-Yugoslav Subaltern (Spivak 
1988).      
     
 




In-betweeness of Romani minorities in post-Yugoslav space 
 
To better grasp the position of Romani minorities in the context of post-Yugoslav 
citizenship regimes’ transformations, the primary argument of this paper borrows its 
theoretical terms from postcolonial vocabulary similar to that used by other Romani 
studies scholars (Kóczé and Trehan 2009). It namely explicates that the position of 
Romani minorities is marked by a fundamental in-betweeness to paraphrase one of the 
main postcolonial theorists Homi Bhabha (1990, 1994, 1996,).2 My first hypothesis is 
that Romani minorities became overrepresented within the groups of noncitizens at 
their place of residence due to socially produced migrations (Sassen 2007) both 
before and after the disintegration of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY). Due to these migrations across former republican and newly established 
state borders, they find themselves within, but also in-between, the grip of multiple 
post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes. Therefore, due to overlapping and spill-over effects 
of one citizenship regime onto another, their position cannot be simply comprehended 
by referring to a single post-Yugoslav citizenship regime, but must be observed in the 
sense of in-betweeness captured by citizenship constellations created in SFRY as well as 
those constructed after the Yugoslav disintegration(s).  
Furthermore, although, as Judith Okely argued, Romani minorities can be 
perceived as the Other in many different societies (1994), I claim that articulating the 
position of Romani minorities as one of the ultimate Other is not applicable to the 
Yugoslav nor to the post-Yugoslav space. Following the latest developments in the 
field of Romani Studies (McGarry and Tremlett 2013), the position of Romani 
minorities3 has to be considered as an in-between hybrid since it cannot be fully 
                                                 
2 Bhabha’s concept of in-betweeness was transferred from postcolonial theory to a postsocialist context 
by Ksenija Vidmar Horvat (2009). According to her analysis, in-betweeness can have certain liberating 
effects for the societies in question (Vidmar Horvat 2009: 64). However, in the post-Yugoslav context, I 
analyse states’ incapacity to adequately address the in-betweeness as presented by the position of 
Romani minorities, which can be then understood as forced in-betweeness (ibid.). Furthermore, it has to 
be noted that although one of the most important monographs on the position of Romani minorities is 
entitled Between Past and Future: the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe (2001), the authors of this edited 
volume do not engage with the postcolonial concept of in-betweeness.   
3 I use the term Romani minorities in the plural form to acknowledge both hybridity and 
heterogeneity of these populations in the post-Yugoslav context. The populations identified as Romani 
minorities are in fact very heterogeneous and hybrid since this designation included various 
perceived and self-identified ‘ethnic’ sub-categories (e.g. Ursari, Kalderash, Sinti, Beash/Boyash, etc.), 
who usually share a very similar socio-economic predicament. The literature focusing on post-
Yugoslav context usually portrays these heterogeneities by extrapolating on the division of Roma, 
Ashkali and Egyptians (RAE) in Kosovo (Marushiakova and Popov 2001, Sigona 2012). However, 
what tends to be ignored in the literature is that there are also other ethnic identifications connected to 
subdivisions within Romani minorities such as Sinti in Slovenia, Vlach Roma in Serbia and Bayash 
Roma in Croatia. All these subdivisions (as in the case of non-Romani populations as well) are 
situational as well as relational and they are being permanently (re-) constructed due to the 
endeavours of different political actors and also everyday contexts, to paraphrase Brubaker et.al. 
(2006).     




comprehended in one-dimensional ethnic terms or solely in socio-economic terms. 
Aligned with this argument, the claim set by this paper is that their place in the 
newly established bodies of post-Yugoslav citizenry was not only defined by ethnic 
engineering (Štiks 2010), but also socio-economic engineering. I argue that the 
different processes of engineering connected to the new definition of post-Yugoslav 
citizenries did not target Romani minorities directly as the ultimate Other, but rather 
represent the failure to address their in-between position. This failure arises from the 
fact that Romani minorities found themselves in-between competing narratives of 
nationalisms (e.g. Croatian majority and Serbian minority in Croatia, Macedonian 
majority and Albanian minority in Macedonia, etc.) and even statehoods in some 
cases (Sigona 2012) and also, in most cases, in-between of discourses on 
transformation of citizenship regimes due to the EU integration processes.  
Due to their in-betweeness, in many instances, they became collateral damage 
of these processes, not only in terms of physical violence, but also involving the 
epistemic violence4 (Spivak 1988) present in drafting citizenship policies of the newly 
established states. In addition, I show that their position was not merely the result of 
an unintended social exclusion, but was in fact a product of both socio-economic and 
ethnic hierarchical inclusion (Negri and Hardt 2000: 194), which positioned Romani 
minorities as semi-citizens (Cohen 2009: 72) in the context of new citizenship regimes.  
Based on my research, I will claim that in this context Romani minorities can 
be perceived, using Spivak’s term (1988), as the post-Yugoslav Subaltern rather than 
the ultimate Other. Conceptualizing the Romani Subaltern slightly differently from 
Nidhi Trehan (2009) and Angela Kóczé (2011), I focus on Romani minorities whose 
voice is not articulated even in the context of the movement for Romani rights due to 
their precarious non-citizen positions. In addition, I argue that even when Romani 
minorities are included in the body of citizenry, such inclusion is often marked by 
discrimination and inequality in accessing certain rights and participating in political 
communities. The position of Romani Subaltern was not completely invented ad 
novum, but reconfigured after the disintegration of SFRY. Therefore, it has to be first 
explained how Romani individuals were positioned as Yugoslav citizens. 
   
Position of Romani minorities in the context of the Yugoslav citizenship regime(s) 
 
Different studies claim that the position of Romani citizens within the socialist 
Yugoslav state was exemplary in comparison to treatment they were subjected to in 
                                                 
4 In this paper, I am using the term epistemic violence in alignment with post-colonial theory, 
specifically Spivak’s understanding of the term, who originally took the term from Foucault (Spivak 
1999: 226). Epistemic violence is a non-physical form of violence and refers to specific discursive 
practices of knowledge/power interplay. This can also include redefinition of certain categories within 
the legal framework (Spivak 1999: 267) to serve new societal hierarchies. The concept of epistemic 
violence was used also by Nidhi Trehan in her analysis of the position of Roma in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Trehan 2009:64). However, she does not apply it to the analysis of the position of Romani 
minorities in the context post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes transformation.  




other socialist countries (Kenrick 2001, Barany 2002). Many of the socialist systems, 
such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary, adopted the policy of an assimilationist 
approach of interpreting ‘Gypsies’ as a deviant social group, which needs to be 
integrated into the working class (Stewart 1997, 2001, McGarry 2010). In contrast to 
this, according to Zoltan Barany, socialist Yugoslavia took an approach of constructive 
interference privileging ethnic integration of its Romani citizens over assimilationist 
policies (Barany 2002: 122). According to Barany and other authors (Barany 2002: 116, 
Crowe 2007: 228), Romani citizens of Yugoslavia were even supposedly recognized as 
a nationality (narodnost),5 while the system provided a different mechanism for 
tackling their structural socio-economic inequality (through the accessible labour 
market, Romani political representation, etc.). Although this view on Yugoslav 
policies toward Romani minorities is widely accepted, there are some voices, which 
are critical toward such a one-sided evaluation of Yugoslavia’s treatment of its 
Romani citizens (Acković 1992, Galjus 1999, Latham 1999).  
It is important to acknowledge that socialist Yugoslavia, in the spirit of 
‘Brotherhood and Unity’, played an important role in the construction of the Romani 
intellectual and political elite. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) made 
special efforts to include those individuals who declared themselves as belonging to 
Romani minorities into its membership. In the 1970s there were more than 2000 
Romani individuals at different levels of the LCY (Kenrick 2001: 406, Barany 2002: 
145). Many of these individuals were at the core of the international Romani 
movement. (Barany 2002: 145, Acton and Klímová 2001: 159-160). The construction of 
the Romani elite with the direct influence of the socialist Yugoslav system, however, 
raises the question of whether this elite should be perceived as a part of Subaltern 
counter-publics (Fraser 1990: 67, Plaut 2012: 56) or as a part of the dominant local 
‘indigenous’ elite, which, according to Spivak, cannot be understood as being a part 
of the Subaltern (Spivak 1988: 79). To solve these dilemmas, we have to further 
examine the position of Romani citizens of Yugoslavia who were not a part of the 
elite. 
 After the Second World War, the Yugoslav state nurtured many different 
institutions and policies that guaranteed equal access to all of its citizens across ethnic 
lines, including to its Romani citizens. However, although individual Romani leaders 
were able to politically participate through the LCY and in the international Romani 
movement and there was a guarantee of cultural rights as well as higher 
employability rates, many individuals categorized as belonging to Romani minorities 
were living in substandard conditions in comparison to the majority populations in 
Yugoslavia, involving inadequate housing, higher poverty and illiteracy rates, etc. 
(Bašić 2010: 34-35, Crowe 2007: 227). Moreover, the position of Romani minorities was 
very diverse considering the regional micro-levels since there was no unified policy 
                                                 
5 For the avoidance of confusion, in this paper I do not use the term ‘nationality’ interchangeably with 
the term ‘citizenship’. By ‘nationality’ I refer to the meaning it had within the 1974 Constitution of 
SFRY, which introduced the dichotomy between the Yugoslav nations (narodi) and nationalities 
(narodnosti). 




toward them at the federal level. This resulted in very different discursive practices.6 
For example, while in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia the Romani language was 
integrated into the multicultural educational curricula, in the Socialist Republic of 
Slovenia a very large number of Romani individuals were placed into schools for 
children with special needs because it was considered that their mother tongue 
(Romani) posed an insurmountable barrier for them to be included into the 
mainstream educational process (Barany 2002: 123, Sardelić 2012: 41). The treatment 
of Romani citizens within SFRY cannot be adequately comprehended without firstly 
considering the nested model of citizenship constellations (Bauböck 2010) in SFRY, 
where it had two levels: the republican and the federal. In addition to the single 
federal Constitution of SFRY, every republic also had its own constitution. Taking 
this into account makes it easier to interpret why many diverse and even 
contradictory policies existed concerning Romani minorities in Yugoslavia (Barany 
2002: 123, Crowe 2007: 226, Sardelić 2012: 209-215).    
The category of Roma, known as Gypsy before the first World Romani 
Congress in 1971, was already included in the question on ethnic affiliation in the 
1948 Yugoslav census and onward (Mrdjen 2002: 92). Although many sources claim 
that with the 1974 SFRY Constitution Roma were recognized as a nationality 
(narodnost) (Djurić 1987, Barany 2002, Crowe 2007), this constitution itself does not in 
fact contain any reference to Roma, while it refers to the rights of the Albanian and 
Turkish nationalities in its Article 269. Legal analysts of the constitutional ethnic 
categorization in Yugoslavia claim that Romani minorities, especially after the 
adoption of the 1974 SFRY Constitution, were considered (although not named) as an 
ethnic group (Várady 1997). However, the 1974 federal Constitution did not refer to 
Roma or to the category of ethnic groups in any of its articles, but only to the 
constitutive nations (narodi) with the right to self-determination and to nationalities 
(narodnosti) with a substantive amount of constitutionally granted rights. Yet at the 
republican level, most of the socialist republics (all but Montenegro and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) did include the category of ethnic groups, albeit without identifying 
them. This left some place for discretion for individual Yugoslav republic to decide 
whether or not to treat Romani minorities as an ethnic group. In the meanwhile, 
Romani minorities themselves were caught in-between due to the lack of a firm 
definition. According to Tibor Várady, although the ethnic groups were not identified 
individually in the republican constitutions while nations and nationalities were, the 
category of ethnic groups was usually reserved for disperse minorities like Roma 
(Várady 1997: 10) perceived as lacking strongly constructed external national homelands 
(Brubaker 1996: 55).  
The rights of ethnic groups were articulated in a diverse manner in different 
constitutional settings. For example, while the constitutions of the Socialist Republics 
of Serbia (Article 194) and Macedonia (Articles 221 and 222), as well as those of the 
                                                 
6 I use the term discursive practices as it was defined by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (1985:107).  




socialist autonomous provinces of Kosovo (Article 187) and Vojvodina (Article 194), 
included a comprehensive set of cultural rights, the constitutions of the Socialist 
Republics of Slovenia (Articles 212 and 214) and Croatia (Article 247) referred only to 
the general anti-discrimination provisions in respect of ethnic groups. The republican 
constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that of Montenegro excluded references 
to ethnic groups altogether. Some researchers were overhasty and concluded that in 
this context Romani minorities were understood as a nationality (Djurić 1987, Barany 
2002: 116). However, this cannot be deduced from the constitutions themselves since 
they specifically name all the communities considered to be nationalities, and Roma 
are not among them. There were, however, many advocates among the non-Romani 
(Šiftar 1980) and Romani (Acković 1992) political elite who argued that the 
identification of Roma as a nationality would bring them not only cultural 
recognition, but with an adequate policy for Roma as an undeveloped nationality (in 
analogy with undeveloped regions), also socio-economic prosperity (Crowe 2007: 
227). Romani activist Dragoljub Acković even claimed that as long as Romani 
minorities are categorized as ethnic groups on the republican level they will remain 
in fact second-class citizens (Acković 1992: 22).7 While simply categorizing Romani 
minorities as an ethnic group does not classify them as second-class citizens per se, we 
can claim that there was a hierarchy of rights among nations-nationalities-ethnic 
groups.8 This becomes even clearer if we take into account that most of the 
constitutions in question, with the exception of those of Kosovo and Macedonia, did 
emphasize equality between nations and nationalities, but not ethnic groups.  
While many studies retroactively reduce the complexities of the Yugoslav 
constitutional system to simple ethnic categories, it has to be noted that they were not 
the main collective category which had certain rights prescribed by the constitution. 
According to Vojin Dimitrijević, the other collective category was the working people, 
who were also the main power holders and had the right to socio-cultural 
organization (Dimitrijević 1995: 69-70). Although Romani minorities were not 
recognized as a nationality, the Romani social movement flourished through various 
socio-cultural organizations as many Romani individuals, and especially those who 
formed the Romani elite, were from the working class.   
However, because socialist Yugoslavia did not simply treat Romani minorities 
as a social group, but also as an ethnic one, it did not introduce a unified plan, as had 
Hungary, for example (Stewart 1997, 2001), on how to assimilate them into the 
working class. Romani minorities were in the Yugoslav case left somewhere in-
between: not completely included into the working class as well as not completely 
                                                 
7 According to Acković, there was a case before the SFRY Constitutional Court in which it was claimed 
that the republican constitutions, which refer to ethnic groups were in conflict with the federal 
constitution since it only uses the terms of ‘nationalities’ and ‘nations’. This case, according to 
Acković, never resulted in a ruling (Acković 1992:17-18). 
8 A similar observation has been made by Gëzim Krasniqi in his CITSEE Working Paper (2013) on 
post-Yugoslav Kosovo, where he claims that there is a hierarchy between different communities, 
although they are recognized as equal in the constitution.  




excluded. According to several research studies, in socialist Hungary more than 75 
percent of the Romani population was included into the labour processes, and hence 
into the working class9 (Kertesi 2004: 44), while in SFRY this number never exceeded 
50 per cent. This was because most Roma were employed in (what was considered to 
be) ‘traditional Roma crafts’, which in most cases were not recognized as formal 
employment (Crowe 2007: 222-223). According to my interlocutors from Romani 
NGOs that I interviewed during my fieldwork in November/December 2012 and my 
other research (Sardelić 2011, 2012), although some Romani individuals were 
included into the working class and into the official working processes, many more 
were (officially or unofficially) self-employed in ‘traditional Romani crafts’ such as 
trough making as well as (what is considered to be less traditional Romani) trading. 
Through this economic niche many individuals recognized as belonging to Romani 
minorities gained a level of respect similar to that which would have been accorded 
to them as an official part of the working class.  
While some members of Romani minorities were traditionally settled 
(especially in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia), many more found gainful 
employment in economic niches that required internal migration across the 
republican borders of SFRY. In addition, many married across republican borders 
(especially where they were localised close to an internal border), and there have also 
been reports of continuous migration due to harassment by the state repressive 
organs such as the police (Komac 2005: 139-140). All this contributes to the fact that 
migrations cannot be simply described as an essentialised characteristic of the 
Romani culture, but it should be understood in the context of all migration being, as 
Saskia Sassen claimed, socially constructed and produced even if it seemingly 
happens on a voluntary basis (Sassen 2007: 131). This includes ‘Romani nomadism’. 
The effect of these continuous internal migrations was that in the end many Romani 
individuals settled down, in most instances in informal settlements, in a Yugoslav 
republic the citizenship of which they did not possess. 10 With the disintegration of 
socialist Yugoslavia, the consequences for these individuals, many of them from 
Romani minorities, were two-fold. Firstly, from being Yugoslav citizens they became, 
in many cases, post-Yugoslav aliens who had to go through the process of 
naturalization, or as Igor Štiks puts it, they became the excluded of the new citizenship 
regimes (Štiks 2010: 15). Secondly, their alternative economic niche was to a large 
extent destroyed with the change of the modes of production from socialist to 
                                                 
9 When using the concept of a working class it has to be taken into account that the working class itself 
was always in the process of being constructed and, similarly to ethnicity, cannot be simply 
essentialised.  
10 According to several of my interlocutors (Sardelić 2012), it was only in the 1970s, when Yugoslav 
policies became oriented towards permanently settling Romani minorities. Although sedentarism was 
required, many Romani individuals still migrated seasonally due to the economic niches they 
employed. 




capitalist11 and by the fact that with the re-positioning of their citizenship status, or a 
lack of any legal status, many of them became less mobile via newly established 
borders.    
 
Re-positioning of Romani minorities as (non-)citizens after the disintegration(s) of 
Yugoslavia 
 
In addition to the more or less peaceful internal migrations within SFRY, a larger 
number of Romani individuals were forced to migrate during the wars in the region, 
which also affected their status. Romani minorities found themselves caught in-
between two fires of former Yugoslav constitutive nations or, as for example in the 
case of Kosovo:12 between constitutive nation and a majority nationality (Perić and 
Demirovski 2000, Sigona 2003). Lacking the recognition as a nation or nationality, the 
best they could hope for was a minority status within the newly established states. 
However, as the paradigmatic example of Kosovo demonstrates, they were often 
forced to flee to save their lives instead (Krasniqi 2010) since they were perceived as 
enemies by both major groups in conflict (Sigona 2003). This led to them becoming 
either internally displaced (Džankić 2010) within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) – an especially acute position in Montenegro - or refugees in the (now 
independent) Republic of Macedonia. Many had no prospect of returning home in the 
foreseeable future. Beside the forced migrations, the position of Romani minorities as 
post-Yugoslav (non-)citizens was further re-configured due to overlapping and spill-
over effects by subsequent proclamations of independence, first by Montenegro and 
then by Kosovo, which produced even more new citizenship regimes as well as new 
citizenship constellations.  
Furthermore, in addition to physical conflicts in the region, many individuals 
categorized as belonging to Romani minorities were subjected to epistemic violence, 
which can be seen indirectly in the re-shaping of citizenship policies of newly 
established states through ethnic engineering (Štiks 2010). In addition, in order to fully 
                                                 
11 One of the side effects of post-socialist transition was not only that Romani individuals were the first 
to be fired from their regular employments, but the shift to capitalist system dismantled their own 
economic niche since there was no more demand for their unique products (e.g. wooden troughs were 
replaced by cheaper plastic ones). 
12 In this sense, we also need to observe the division that became sharper among Romani minorities in 
post-conflict Kosovo. Here, as Richard Jenkins puts it, there is a visible interplay between the external 
categorization and self-identification (Jenkins 1997), which strengthened identification of Albanian 
speaking Egyptians and Ashkali in opposition to Romani-speaking Roma, albeit they were formerly 
considered to all be Roma (Marushiakova and Popov 2001). Although these divisions did exist before 
within the Roma community, they became more abundant as they designated markers of their position 
in the conflict (cultural representations of pro-Serb Roma and pro-Albanian Ashkali and Egyptians). 
According to Biljana Djordjevic, this also resulted in the differentiated post-conflict politics of return, 
where Ashkali and Egyptians were more often among the returnees to Kosovo than Roma (for details 
on the politics of return see Đorđević’ Working Paper). Although there are differences in position of 
Ashkali, Egyptians and Roma in Kosovo, Krasniqi argues that they all belong to the invisible non-
dominant community in Kosovo (Krasniqi 2013).  




comprehend the re-positioning of Romani minorities in terms of epistemic violence, we 
must also take into account what some see as a form of socio-economic engineering. 
Both of these processes indirectly affected Romani minorities due to their in-
betweenness as they were not positioned in the bipolar dichotomy of the dominant 
(usually majority) group and the minority group represented as the ultimate Other. 
This also manifested itself in access to citizenship for Romani minorities as well as in 
their status and (lack of) rights as non-citizens.  
   
Access to citizenship for Romani minorities in the post-Yugoslav space  
 
Romani minorities faced numerous obstacles in relation to access to citizenship of 
post-Yugoslav states. Not all of those difficulties arose only from the armed conflict 
or forced migrations in the post-Yugoslav region, but also from epistemic violence that 
redefined different citizenship acts and hence also re-positioned Romani minorities in 
the context of citizenship regimes. Although it cannot simply be deduced that persons 
identified as belonging to Romani minorities were direct targets of this epistemic 
violence enacted through citizenship acts, the resulting position of Romani minorities 
was allegedly an unanticipated side effect of the discriminatory citizenship regimes 
created by these acts. These side effects resulted from the dismantling of bifurcated 
citizenship of socialist Yugoslavia (Štiks 2010) and also from some of the features of 
the position of many Romani individuals before and after the disintegration of SFRY. 
These included inter-generational poverty, living in informal settlements (and births 
in domicile conditions), and hierarchical inclusion in the educational system. Thus, 
belonging to a non-dominant ethnic group was not the only decisive factor for 
Romani minorities, and the socio-economic position of the vast majority of Romani 
individuals has to be also taken into account when studying their access to 
citizenship.   
Not all Romani individuals were denied access to citizenship in the SFRY 
successor states in which they resided. Since there was a legal continuity between 
SFRY republican citizenship and citizenship of the newly established states, those 
Romani individuals who possessed the citizenship of the socialist republic where 
they officially resided automatically became citizens of the respective successor state. 
However, those individuals, who did not possess birth certificates due to the fact that 
their births had not been registered, experienced problems although they should in 
fact have been among the included (Štiks 2010:12). Yet, the main subgroups of Romani 
minorities who faced the greatest difficulties in regularising their citizenship status 
were those who did not formerly possess the republican citizenship of the socialist 
republic where they (formally or informally) resided. Although Romani minorities 
were not the only ones who found themselves to be the excluded in this sort of post-
Yugoslav citizenship constellations, the reasons why their access to citizenship was in 
many instances obstructed lie within the determinants of their positioning specifically 
as Romani minorities.  




Those former Yugoslav citizens who in the new states fell into the category of 
the excluded (Štiks 2010:13) became aliens in the country of their residence and had to 
undergo the process of naturalization. Even in those cases where there was an option 
of facilitated acquisition (in a provisional period) of citizenship, for the former SFRY 
citizens with other former republican citizenship, in most cases there was a 
requirement of registered residence e.g. in Slovenia on a certain date (Deželan 2011), 
or a requirement of a permanent residency for up to 15 years in Macedonia 
(Spaskovska 2010). Since the majority of Romani individuals in all of the post-
Yugoslav states lived in informal settlements13 (Klopčič 2007, Štambuk 2005, Jakšić 
and Bašić 2005) and many migrated across republican borders within SFRY due to 
their employment in a specific economic niche, it was often the case that they were 
not able to prove de iure their de facto residency. Due to this in-betweeness they were 
not able to prove that they had met this criterion for acquisition of citizenship. The 
administrative registration still remains a difficulty for many Romani individuals in 
the region living in substandard housing conditions. This problem was to some 
extent bypassed in Montenegro, where individuals could register their legal address 
at the offices of the Roma National Council (UNHCR 2011: 31). The same can be done 
in Serbia at a social services office (Article 11 of the Residency Act, 2012).14  
Secondly, in many instances Romani individuals were not able to fulfil the so-
called ‘language and culture’ requirements for the acquisition of citizenship in post-
Yugoslav states. Although they were not the main targets of these requirements - in 
Macedonia, for instance, the Albanian minority was targeted, while in Croatia, the 
targeted group was the Serb minority - they were caught in-between and most affected 
by them. For example, according to Article 8(4) of the Act on Croatian Citizenship, 
one must be ‘proficient in the Croatian language and Latin script, and […] familiar 
with the Croatian culture and social arrangements’ in order to acquire Croatian 
citizenship. Although the main target group, in the context of conflict, was the Serb 
minority, this condition indirectly affected those who were illiterate since this meant 
that they were not able to prove their knowledge of the Latin script. According to the 
                                                 
13 According to a report written by Marina Simeunović for the ‘Best Practices of Roma Inclusion’ 
project conducted by OSCE, the largest Romani settlement in Novi Sad called Veliki Rit, has only two 
legalised streets, while other parts are not legalised. Most individuals living in a legalised part of 
Veliki Rit did not face problems in accessing citizenship, while many of those living in the informal 
streets face several obstacles (Simeunović 2013:13). I observed something similar during my fieldwork 
in Macedonia. In the famous Romani municipality of Skopje, Šuto Orizari, which is usually portrayed 
as a model of coexistence, a clear division exists in living standards. While the main roads are paved, 
have street lights and larger houses, many side streets are unpaved and muddy, without illumination, 
and with ‘cardboard’ houses. According to the information given to me by the local NGOs (especially 
the Romani NGO Ambrela), most of the Romani individuals living in these side streets face several 
obstacles in their access to citizenship at their place of residence. The spatial segregation exists not 
only between Romani and Non-Romani community, but also within the Romani community itself.  
14 According to the above mentioned report, many Romani individuals from Veliki Rit in Vojvodina 
were encouraged to use a fictitious address for the purposes of acquiring basic ID documentation and 
citizenship (Simeunović 2013: 37). 




UNDP report (2011), the illiteracy rates among Romani minorities are much higher 
than those among the majority populations in all post-Yugoslav states.15 This stems 
from (both past and present) hierarchical inclusion of many Romani individuals in 
the educational system, for example by placement in segregated classes or schools for 
children with special needs. Furthermore, in some cases, Romani children (especially 
women) never attended school altogether (Sardelić et al. 2010). The illiteracy of many 
Romani individuals was therefore produced by the discursive practices of 
institutional racism (Balibar 2004). According to the European Roma Rights Centre 
(ERRC), the case of an illiterate Romani woman who claimed that she had been 
denied access to Croatian citizenship was brought before the Constitutional Court of 
Croatia. However, the constitutional court decided that she was not entitled to 
Croatian citizenship, even though she had lived in Croatia since 1987, due to her lack 
of knowledge of the Latin script. The ERRC criticised this decision harshly because 
Croatia offered facilitated naturalization to non-resident individuals of Croatian 
ethnicity, while failing to take into account the special conditions under which non-
majority residents, such as Romani minorities, live (ERRC 2004).  
Finally, one of the major problems for many members of Romani minorities for 
acquiring citizenship in their country of residence is the lack of guaranteed funds. For 
example, even in those cases where they fulfil all the criteria for acquisition of 
citizenship, many Romani individuals are not able to pay fees and taxes connected to 
the administrative procedure of naturalization (PRAXIS 2011). Furthermore, after the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, many Romani individuals (especially women) in 
Slovenia fell into the category of the erased (Kogovšek Šalamon 2011). These were not 
only ‘non-autochthonous’ Romani minorities living in the urban centres of Slovenia, 
but also many residing within the ‘autochthonous’ area of Romani settlement 
(Sardelić 2012). Since they missed the 6-month period for acquiring Slovenian 
citizenship in 1991, they were erased from the register of permanent residents 
(Deželan 2011: 11-12). Again they were not the ones who were explicitly targeted in 
this case, but were caught in-between redefining of the Other in Slovenia. Although 
most of these Romani individuals were able to get their permanent residence 
registered two decades later, being erased meant they had no right to work, and as a 
result they were unable to provide for themselves. Furthermore, at the present 
moment, they are still discriminated against on the labour market in Slovenia and 
have difficulties in acquiring employment (Sardelić 2012). According to Article 10(4) 
of the Citizenship Act of the Republic of Slovenia, a person who wants to acquire 
Slovenian citizenship by naturalization must ‘have guaranteed funds that enable 
material and social security’. Although this provision is not atypical for citizenship 
acts, considering the Slovenian Citizenship Act, it is especially dubious in the case of 
                                                 
15 Illiteracy rate here measures absolute illiteracy, which includes inability to sign one’s own name 
according to the definition of UNESCO: 
http://www.unesco.org/education/GMR2006/full/chapt6_eng.pdf (last accessed on 15th April 2013)  




the erased whose rights, such as the right to work and health care, were annulled by 
that very state. 
 
The wide variety of post-Yugoslav non-citizen statuses and the position of Romani 
minorities 
 
The next question that needs to be addressed in respect to the status dimension of 
citizenship is the position of those members of Romani minorities who were not able 
to regularize their status as citizens of the post-Yugoslav state in which they reside, as 
well as what are the circumstances in which their position was shaped. It has to be 
taken into account that several transformations of post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes 
reshaped the position of Romani minorities. According to the UNHCR Report on 
Statelessness in South Eastern Europe (2011) individuals identified as belonging to 
Romani minorities are one of the most affected in the region. According to this report, 
due to their marginalised yet not completely excluded position, Romani individuals 
have become an overrepresented group of people among those who fall into the 
category of non-citizens in their place of residence (UNHCR 2011:16). However, their 
status was in many instances also not regulated as legal aliens with permanent 
residence, but with a plethora of various other non-citizen statuses such as: legally 
invisible persons and displaced persons both as IDPs and refugees (UNHCR 2011, 
Džankić 2012).     
After the disintegration of SFRY, the phenomenon of statelessness en masse 
was avoided due to the principle of legal continuity of the former republican 
citizenship with the citizenship of the respective newly established post-Yugoslav 
states. However, the republican citizen registers were in many instances incomplete. 
Furthermore, a larger problem that occurred was that many people did not possess 
the republican citizenship of the state they resided in, which left them in a sort of a 
‘legal limbo’ (Štiks 2010), as they became non-citizens. Most of these people could not 
be considered de iure stateless since they did possess the citizenship of another post-
Yugoslav state, which left them positioned in a very specific legal in-betweenness. 
Many cases of de iure statelessness in post-Yugoslav states were solved 
through the use of ad hoc procedures (UNHCR 2011: 11). Post-Yugoslav states that are 
members of the UN are all parties to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons, which obliges them to address the position of stateless persons, who 
are protected under this international convention. Although most post-Yugoslav 
states did not offer the so-called ‘zero-option’, de iure statelessness did not present an 
exceptional difficulty according to the UNHCR (2011). A much larger problem that 
occurred after the armed conflicts (but not simply for this single reason) in the post-
Yugoslav region that especially affected Romani minorities was de facto statelessness, 
or, as the UNHCR refers to this phenomenon, a large group of people found 
themselves in the position where they were at the risk of becoming stateless. The 
legal definition of a stateless person is ‘a person who is not considered to be a citizen 
by any state’ (Weissbrodt 2008: 84). On the other hand, as Weissbrodt claims, this 




legal definition is too narrow to encompass all the cases of people who are stateless in 
effect although they are de iure citizens of a certain state. Therefore, another category 
needs to be used, that of de facto statelessness: ‘Persons who are de facto stateless often 
have nationality according to the law, but either this nationality is not effective or 
they cannot prove their nationality’ (Weissbrodt 2008: 84). This category of people 
found themselves in very unfavourable in-between conditions. On one hand, as they 
were not recognized as de iure stateless, they were not protected by the 1954 
Convention. On the other hand, they were not protected as citizens by their own 
states either. According to the majority of reports on this issue in the former 
Yugoslavia, Romani minorities were the ones who were the most affected and found 
themselves in this sort of predicament (UNHCR 2011). 
Within Romani minorities there are two main (and in many instances 
overlapping) groups which live not only as non-citizens, but also as de facto stateless. 
Both of these groups face difficulties in accessing their personal documentation. 
Firstly, according to many NGOs in the post-Yugoslav region as well as to 
international organizations (especially the UNHCR), many Romani individuals fall 
into the category of so-called legally invisible persons (PRAXIS 2011, UNHCR 2011).16 
The second group of those who are often at the risk of becoming stateless, to use the 
UNHCR’s concept, are those who are the long-term post-conflict displaced persons. 
According to the UNHCR official data, there are 29,301 displaced individuals 
identified as belonging to Romani minorities in the post-Yugoslav region, excluding 
Slovenia. However, unofficial estimates of the numbers of those who are 
undocumented and displaced are much higher (UNHCR 2011: 92).  
Romani minorities comprise the vast majority of those who are considered to 
be legally invisible persons (PRAXIS 2011). This occurs because of the failure to 
register them in birth registration books. Regardless of the reason, the effect is the 
same: legally these persons do not exist. For example, according to the UNHCR office 
in Kosovo, between 20 and 40 per cent of the RAE population are not registered and 
are, therefore, legally invisible and hence at ‘the risk of becoming stateless’ (OSCE 
2007: 5). In most of the other states, it is difficult to make estimations with any degree 
of certainty.17  
                                                 
16 The issue of legally invisible persons became addressed during the visa liberation process since it 
was considered to be one of the benchmarks of the visa liberations. Countries in question (e.g. Serbia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, BIH) due to EC pressures in the negotiations for the visa liberation had to 
offer facilitated access to personal documents for those who have not been previously registered 
(Kacarska 2012: 9-10). Although in most of the countries in question the process of visa liberation had 
been completed in 2009 and 2010, according to legal advocacy NGOs in the region (PRAXIS, Your 
Rights, Legal Centre) as well as Romani NGOs (Lil, Roma National Centrum, Sonce), the issue of 
legally invisible persons is far from being resolved to the present day.   
17 I have had the opportunity to conduct fieldwork in all post-Yugoslav countries, where I also visited 
Romani settlements in the majority of those states. In each Romani settlement I visited there was 
usually at least one person who had irregular status and was thus legally invisible. 




According to UNHCR, the NGO PRAXIS in Serbia, Romani NGO Lil in 
Macedonia, Civil Rights Program in Kosovo and the NGO Your Rights in BIH,18 there 
are a variety of reasons why Romani individuals often lack birth registration 
documents. In many instances, this problem is inter-generational. Although 
according to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, no child should be deprived 
of personal name or citizenship, in the case of legally invisible persons, many of 
whom are children, they are effectively deprived of both. For example, many children 
who are born at home are not registered within the legally required period of time, or 
their births are not even reported, which is the first step in the procedure for 
registering a birth. In many such instances, they are born to mothers who either lack 
identification documents themselves or are unable to cover hospital fees. When 
children are born in hospitals, the hospitals themselves are usually obliged to report 
the birth of a child to the authorities. However, this step alone does not complete the 
registration of a birth, which has to be completed by the parents (or legal guardians) 
of the child. This further step introduces additional problems if the mother does not 
have proper identification. Due to their socio-economic position, many Romani 
women give birth to a child in a hospital under the name of another woman who 
possesses health insurance (UNHCR 2011: 29). Furthermore, in some cases, such as in 
the Republic of Macedonia, the registration process is more complicated when no 
marriage certificate can be produced (UNHCR 2011: 31). 
 All of these cases then require subsequent registration that also requires funds 
for the payment of the connected fees and taxes, which someone who is a legally 
invisible person does not possess. Furthermore, the procedures can be very lengthy 
since in some instances the mother has to first become registered herself in order for 
her child to be registered. Additionally, the burden of proof lies with the person (e.g. 
proving that he or she is not registered in another country) who wishes to register 
themselves in a birth register and, having done so, also in the books of the citizenship 
registry. According to the UNHCR and to several legal advocacy NGOs in the region, 
many individuals would qualify for citizenship in their country of residence 
immediately if they were not legally invisible.19  
While in many cases the existence of legally invisible persons is connected to 
the armed conflicts, many of them did in fact migrate internally in SFRY before the 
wars started. In some instances, such as in Montenegro, many of the so-called Romani 
minorities had actually migrated from Kosovo in the 1970s and their position is 
                                                 
18 This information is based on interviews conducted during my fieldwork in November and 
December 2012.  This information is also present in the work published by UNHCR and mentioned 
NGOs.   
19 This information is also based on interviews conducted during my fieldwork in November and 
December 2012 in different post-Yugoslav states. I interviewed a variety of different actors dealing 
with the position of Romani minorities in the region such as the representatives of international 
organizations, governments and NGOS.  




somewhere in-between the domicile Romani minorities and Romani IDPs.20 Although 
they were not displaced by the Kosovo War, they faced the spill-over effects of it as 
well as the subsequent proclamations of independence first by Montenegro, then by 
Kosovo. Although their situation was seemingly different from that of the displaced 
RAE, they also found themselves in a position that made it difficult to regularise their 
status. Many of them are not able to prove their initial citizenship due to displaced or 
destroyed registry books from Kosovo. In order to regularise their status, they have to 
initiate a re-registration process (UNHCR 2011). 
Another category in which many Romani individuals in the post-Yugoslav 
region fall and also illustrates their in-betweeness is the category of displaced persons. 
In this category, they are the ones who have the most difficulties in regularising their 
non-citizen status in the county they reside in, and hence also their access to 
citizenship. For example, the Republic of Macedonia offered facilitated naturalization 
for those with the status of refugees after the Kosovo crisis. However, this option is 
reserved only for those who have 6 years of uninterrupted legal residence in 
Macedonia (Spaskovska 2010b: 17), which presents a difficulty for those Roma who 
live in informal settlements without legal registration. Problems created by similar 
provisions are faced by many Romani individuals throughout the post-Yugoslav 
region. 
A very vexing and complex issue, that also illustrates the in-betweeness of 
Romani minorities, can be observed in the case of internally displaced persons in 
Montenegro after the proclamation of independence in 2006. In Konik, on the 
outskirts of Podgorica, we find the largest refugee camp in Europe,21 with most its 
inhabitants belonging to Romani minorities. They are IDPs who were forced to 
migrate within the then existing Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from Kosovo (as part 
of Serbia) to Montenegro (as the second federal unit) during the Kosovo conflict in 
1999. Although the 2011 UNHCR report insists that these people should have the 
status of refugees, the Government of Montenegro considers them as IDPs since at 
the time of their forced migrations they did not cross an internationally recognized 
border as Montenegro was not an independent state at the time. According to the 
Strategy for Durable Solutions of Issues regarding Displaced and Internally Displaced 
Persons in Montenegro with the Special Emphasis to the Konik Area (2011), there are also 
legal provisions on how the status of these IDPs should be regulated in Montenegro. 
According to the legal provisions in Montenegro, these ‘IDPs’ should gain the status 
of aliens with permanent residence (Strategy 2011: 11). The Act on the Amendment of 
the Act on Aliens envisages a transitional period (which was prolonged until the end 
                                                 
20 UNDP includes this group of Romani minorities in the category of domicile Roma (they dealt with 
around such 700 individuals who lacked birth registration), although they do not fit the standard 
definition of domicile Roma in Montenegro, who have been living in Montenegro for many 
generations (Delić 2008 in Džankić 2010:17) and who all possess Montenegrin citizenship (Džankić 
2010: 17).  
21 Source: http://reliefweb.int/report/montenegro/day-life-europe’s-largest-refugee-camp (last accessed 
on 14th  August 2013) 




of December 2012) within which all the IDPs are supposed to regulate their status as 
aliens with permanent residence. Should they fail to do so, they will be considered to 
be illegal residents in Montenegro, unless they opt to regularise their status on a 
temporary basis. In order to acquire Montenegrin citizenship, one must first have the 
status of an alien with permanent residency for 10 years and renounce the previous 
citizenship since Montenegrin legislation does not in general permit dual citizenship 
(Džankić 2010). The problem for many Romani IDPs in this situation is twofold. 
Firstly, many of them are not able to gain the non-citizen status of an alien with 
permanent residence stay due to the lack of documents. In January 2013, the 
discussion began in the Montenegrin parliament on prolonging the transitional 
period for the second time. However, in June 2013, the proposal on extension was still 
not passed by the parliament.22 Secondly, those who are able to regulate their status 
as aliens with permanent residency are not able to gain Montenegrin citizenship due 
to the cost of the procedure for renouncing their previous (usually Serbian) 
citizenship (UNHCR 2010).  
 
Romani individuals as citizens of post-Yugoslav states 
 
In this section, I will focus on the rights dimension of citizenship affecting Romani 
minorities as it was manifested in legal policies and other tangible measures taken in 
regards to what can be considered as minority protection. As pointed out by Džankić 
(2013), minority rights are not created in a vacuum, but are also a reflection of 
political debates in post-Yugoslav states. Here, again, as I argue, Romani minorities 
found themselves in-between these debates, albeit usually not as direct addressees, but 
rather as collateral damage. Besides local factors also the international community 
(especially the EU) plays a significant role in defining the framework of minority 
rights. Furthermore, none of the post-Yugoslav states made a claim to be ‘difference 
blind’ since they all experimented with their own interpretations of group-
differentiated rights and hence with their conceptions of differentiated citizenship 
(Young 1989) and multicultural citizenship (Kymclika 1995). While the normative 
purpose of these rights was to enhance equality of all citizens, in many cases it 
produced disparity in the position of citizens.  
As far as constitutional recognition is concerned, Romani minorities (in the 
case of Kosovo including also Ashkali and Egyptians) are named in the constitutions 
of Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Montenegro, for example, does name 
some minorities (Serbian, Croatian, etc.), but not the Roma, who are included under 
the denomination ‘other’. Bosnia and Herzegovina still disputably refers to all the 
minorities, including Romani, as the ‘others’ in its Dayton Constitution, while it 
names three constitutive nations. Post-Yugoslav states introduced different practices 
of constitutional recognition in relation to Romani minorities. However, they all 
                                                 
22 Source: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/montenegro-a-politicised-judiciary-delivers-slow-
justice (last accessed on 9th  August 2013) 




developed legislation governing minorities (in the case of Slovenia, Kosovo and 
Vojvodina minorities are named as communities), which indirectly or directly 
included reference to Romani minorities.  
In many post-Yugoslav legal acts on minority protection, it is directly stated, 
that they were constructed in alignment with the norms set by a number of 
international organizations. For example, Constitutional Act on Rights of National 
Minorities in Croatia, in its preamble stresses that it was drafted in accordance with 
the principles of the international law (it also lists the convention and declarations), 
while the Act on the Protection of Rights of Members of National Minorities emphasises 
that the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) is a part 
of legal system in BIH. However, at the same time, contrary to the norms of 
international law, most of the national acts on minority protection explicitly refer to 
citizens as potential carriers of minority rights and not residents. This means that they 
are not acknowledging the factual reality that some minorities, especially the Romani 
as discussed above, are overrepresented in the group of residents with different non-
citizen statuses. For example, the discrepancy between minority citizens and minority 
residents, especially as far as Romani minorities are concerned, is visible in 
Montenegro since the domiciled Romani population with Montenegrin citizenship is 
a lot less numerous than the RAE population with precarious non-citizenship 
statuses, which occurred due to internal and forced migration, state disintegration 
and post-Yugoslav wars (Džankić 2013). Moreover, precisely Romani minorities, who 
are not able to regularise their citizenship status, are among the most disadvantaged 
populations in need of special consideration and protection, but the minority 
protections of their states of residence does not include them. This therefore further 
stipulates a circulus vitiosus where many Romani minorities are kept in the in-
betweenness.  
 Secondly, although most of the minority acts seemingly introduce group-
differentiated rights with the specific focus on group and cultural identities of minority 
groups (e.g. such as a right to their own culture), these rights remain very generalised 
and they do not target specific needs of each minority. This is specifically visible in 
the case of Romani minorities since their position is specific to other minorities. For 
example, in comparison to other minorities, most individuals identified as belonging 
to Romani minorities live below the poverty line in substandard housing conditions 
and many times without proper access to health care and educational system (Klopčič 
2007, Štambuk 2005, Jakšić and Bašić 2005, Bašić 2002). Moreover, while legal acts on 
minority protections in most post-Yugoslav countries treat Roma as if they were in 
the same position as other national minorities (such as the Serbian minority in Croatia 
or the Albanian minority in Macedonia), they also do not acknowledge the 
stigmatised cultural representation of Romani minorities. Such cultural 
representation has a direct effect on those who are identified as belonging to Romani 
minorities by others. Romani minorities often do not identify as being Romani 
themselves, but identify themselves instead as members of a majority or even as 
members of a more powerful minority (Galjus 1999). This brings us to a typical ‘play 




with numbers’. Many legal acts on minority rights (such as in Croatia, Macedonia) 
include provisions according to which there is an obligation for a minority language 
to be introduced in the public sphere in those areas where the minority population in 
question exceeds certain percentage of the overall population. According to the 
official statistics from the population censuses, Romani minorities in most 
administrative units do not exceed the percentage for these provisions to be 
implemented. The position of Romani minorities can again be illustrated by in-
betweeness. Although the provisions for all minority groups in these cases are equal, 
they create a special sort of unevenness, where some minorities, officially interpreted 
as more numerous, have access to certain rights, while, in this case, for Romani 
minorities the access to these rights exists only on paper because of the stigmatised 
nature of the minority status.  
While most post-Yugoslav countries included Romani minorities into the 
generic minority rights legislation, Slovenia took a different approach with the 
introduction of the Romany Community Act. This law was introduced due to pressure 
from the international community after the forced eviction of the Roma settlement 
near Ambrus by the Slovenian government in 2006 (Vidmar Horvat et al. 2008). At 
first glance it seems that in regards to the Romani minorities, Slovenia took an 
approach leading towards differentiated citizenship (Young 1989) including more 
specific aspects of the position of Romani minorities as a disadvantaged group, not 
merely as an ethno-cultural minority. However, taking the content of these rights 
reserved for Romani minorities in comparison to ‘autochthonous’ Hungarian and 
Italian community, we can again observe unevenness being created. While the 
national council in the case of Hungarian and Italian community has veto powers on 
matters concerning these two minorities, Romani national council has only a 
consultative mandate without veto power. Furthermore, while members of the 
Hungarian and Italian national councils are elected, two thirds of the Romani 
national council is simply appointed (without elections), by the Roma union of 
Slovenia (Sardelić 2013). This act therefore introduced provisions for the creation of 
the self-appointed Romani political elite disengaged from most of the members of the 
Romani community on the margins who have their voices silenced. 
Although most of the post-Yugoslav states did not follow the example of 
Slovenia’s introduction of the specific act for the Romani minority, they did however 
take an in-between approach and constructed different Roma national programs to 
address specific disadvantages faced by Romani minorities since all of these states are 
members of the Decade of Roma Inclusion (except Slovenia, which have observer 
status). These programmes were specifically designed to address disadvantages faced 
by Romani minorities including for example lack of identity documents and non-
citizenship statuses. However, many of these programmes failed in the 
implementation phase. Furthermore, while some Roma national programs do 
acknowledge the disadvantages faced by Romani minorities they do not present 
viable plans of how to solve them. For example, in the court case Orsus and Others v. 
Croatia, European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that Romani children were 




put into segregated classes although the state’s defence was that they were put into 
these classes for advancement of their language skills. According to the National 
Strategy for the Inclusion of Roma until 2020 drafted by the Croatian government, all 
Roma-only classes should be eradicated by 2020. However, in the meantime, many 
Romani children still remain in segregated classes. Moreover, in another state context, 
the ECtHR ruling in the (in-)famous case Sejdic and Finci v. BIH did raise awareness 
that some of the BIH citizens are in fact second-class citizens or semi-citizens since 
although they possess citizenship of their state they cannot politically participate 
fully since they are not part of one of the three designated constitutive people. 
Romani minorities are particularly affected since they do not have the right to voice 
their most disadvantaged position. Furthermore, while there are many debates and 
roundtables organized, according to the FCNM State report on BIH, there is no 
solution in sight, which would be acceptable to include Romani minorities fully into 
the citizenry in the foreseeable future.  
As seen in the above described discursive practices - segregated classes for 
Romani children in Croatia, exclusion from full political participation in BIH, self-
proclaimed non-elected Romani elite in Slovenia, incapacitated Romani national 
councils, etc. – the position of Romani post-Yugoslav citizens can be characterized by 
a specific in-betweeness categorizing them as semi-citizens at best, even in those cases 
when they do possess citizenship of their state of residency. Although all of the 
described discursive practices were somehow connected to experimentation with 
multicultural or differentiated citizenship (Kymlicka 1995, Young 1989), they in fact 
mostly resulted in inequality, discrimination or simply de facto uneven position of 
Romani minorities. In addition, although some of these practices were presented to 
empower Romani minorities and ensure their ‘special treatment’ and representation, 
they in fact silenced them and positioned them as a post-Yugoslav Subaltern.  
Finally, many Romani citizens of post-Yugoslav states found themselves again 
caught in-between more politicised juggling among some post-Yugoslav states and 
some EU states, that is a debate on the Schengen visa free regime and post-Yugoslav 
asylum seekers in the EU. The benchmarks for visa liberalisation included ensuring of 
freedom of movement for all citizens as well as protection of minority rights 
(Kacarska 2012: 6). After the visa liberation process was concluded, there was an 
increase of asylum seekers from the Western Balkans. The overwhelming majority of 
these individuals came from Romani minorities. Many EU countries then demanded 
restrictions to be implemented on it from the countries in question. This led to a 
specific ethnic and socio-economic profiling of certain groups, especially Romani 
minorities, whose freedom of movement was put into question by their own 
countries (Kacarska 2012: 19-20).  
Paradoxically, to preserve visa-free travel for all citizens, the countries in 
question (especially Serbia and Macedonia with the largest Romani populations), had 
to practice de facto discrimination by restricting the freedom of movement of the most 
vulnerable group within their citizenry to prevent them becoming ‘bogus’ asylum 
seekers. Those Romani individuals who were able to seek asylum in the EU had their 




citizenship status regulated and were able to obtain a biometric passport and, from 
this perspective, they were in a better position than those who found themselves 
within the plethora of non-citizen statuses. However, albeit they were in a slightly 
better position than the latter, most of them still find themselves below the poverty 
line.23 This illustrates well that Romani minorities remain on the margins of post-




Romani minorities will remain on the margins of new citizenship regimes in Southeast 
Europe for the foreseeable future. Many of them live as non-citizens and de facto 
stateless persons in their place of residence. Even for those who have access to 
citizenship, their status as citizens is often marked by discrimination and inequality. 
As I argued in this paper, the reasons why Romani minorities remain on the margins 
cannot be simply found in the idea that Romani minorities are conceived as an Other, 
as many have argued before. According to my line of reasoning, Romani minorities in 
the post-Yugoslav context were more caught in-between the conflict of those who 
mutually perceived each other as an ultimate Other and were hierarchically 
positioned according to the both sides. I showed in this paper that hierarchical 
inclusion was to a certain extent present already in the Yugoslav context as far as 
Romani minorities are concerned. However, these edges of hierarchical inclusion 
became even sharper in the post-Yugoslav contexts. As I analysed in this paper, the 
sharpening of hierarchical inclusion of Romani minorities, did not occur only due to 
armed conflict and physical violence in the region. In addition, the epistemic violence 
manifested in the transformation of the post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes played a 
very important role. Through this epistemic violence the hybrid position of Romani 
minorities became even more visible since it was affected not only by the ethnic, but 
also by socio-economic engineering that labelled the transformations of the post-
Yugoslav citizenship regimes.  
In this paper I aimed to show that the reason for structural disadvantages 
faced by Romani minorities cannot be reduced to reasons featured in their perceived 
identity and the dimension of belonging. It is the multi-layered processes of 
citizenship engineering at the access and rights dimensions of citizenship that bring 
Romani minorities to such a disempowered position. The predicament of Romani 
minorities in post-Yugoslav space also includes their multiple silencing, despite the 
existence of the Romani political elites and their clamorous activism. Again, the 
reason for this multiple silencing is not hidden in the malevolence of these elites 
                                                 
23 According to the interlocutors from my fieldwork, most of the Romani individuals from the post-
Yugoslav states in question (Macedonia and Serbia), who sought asylum in the EU, were aware that 
they will be returned to their country of origin, which show a different pattern of migration from those 
Romani individuals who are EU citizens. However, this was one of the economic strategies of survival 
during the more difficult periods (e.g. winter time), while Romani individuals with EU citizenship 
intend to stay in the EU states to which they migrated.    




themselves, but in the system of minorities representation in general, which most 
often latently only re-confirms the hegemonic ideologies of the states in question. In 
this framework, however, Romani minorities are positioned as the post-Yugoslav 
Subaltern, who cannot directly voice their own concerns.  
The position of Romani minorities also indicates certain overlapping and spill-
over effects which post-Yugoslav citizenship regimes have placed onto one another, 
and how they are still bound as citizenship constellations. As these citizenship 
constellations are being rapidly transformed while the countries in question are joining 
the EU, the re-positioning of Romani Subaltern in accordance to these phenomena 
needs to be studied further. Namely since there are no viable solutions for including 
all Romani minorities effectively into the body of post-Yugoslav citizenries, it could 
be deduced that the EU accession will merely bring the extension of EU apartheid for 
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